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NEW YORK
Background
Unlike most other states, New York has implemented retail electric restructuring through
administrative decisions by
the Public Service Commission (PSC). There is no statutory mandate for retail electric
restructuring. Since 1997, the New York Public Service Commission has issued orders and
approved restructuring settlements that have phased in retail electric competition for all
customers, but the implementation of restructuring has varied among the different electric
utilities, and there is not a uniform market structure.
However, in all its
restructuring decisions, the PSC has required the local electric utility to provide
Default Service, referred to as the Provider of Last Resort, at least during the
transition period, the terms and pricing for which varies by individual utility
settlements. In most decisions, the settlement resulted in either rate freezes (e.g., New
York State Electric and Gas Co.) or modest rate reductions for residential customers.
Unlike other settlements, however, Consolidated Edison (which serves New York City and
Westchester County) proposed to sell its power plantsi
(divest)
by competitive bid and provide Provider of Last Resort Service by relying on the wholesale
market and passing through this rate on a variable basis every month. At the time of the
restructuring settlement, both Consolidated Edison (ConEd) and the Commission portrayed
the settlement as one that would result in a 10 percent rate reduction for customers over
the five-year term of the plan.ii
ConEd serves 2.5 million
customers, but the average monthly usage for residential customers is very low compared to
other electric utilities. Residential customers use an average of 350 kWh per month, due
primarily to the plethora of multi-unit structures and apartments in New York City.
Furthermore, ConEds customers have always had a monthly variable in bills due to a
fuel adjustment mechanism that raises bills in the summer even under traditional
regulation. Finally, ConEds rates have been very high historically due to the lack
of sufficient generation sources within its service territory and reliance on high-priced
nuclear power and on long-term and expensive Qualified Facility contracts
negotiated in the 1980s.
The PSC has pending a major
investigation of its 2000 competition policies, including the structure and role of
utilities in providing POLR service.iii The PSC staff
was required to issue a "strawman" proposal for POLR service in mid-January
2001.iv Options considered included the gradual
elimination of the utility in the provision of commodity services and the use of a
competitive bid to obtain POLR service at market-based rates. The staff's approach was
based on the notion that the utility should ultimately have no obligation to serve, except
for regulated delivery or distribution functions, and that customers should be expected to
enter the competitive market by a certain date and then be "given" to
competitive marketers in proportion to the market share obtained by the marketer.
Among the many issues
considered in the Working Groups formed by the Commission was whether the PSC had the
legal authority to order or even approve any utility's proposal to exit the retail market
and become a "wires"-only utility. The parties submitted briefs, but the PSC has
made no decision or ruling on this significant issue. However, comments submitted by the
New York Attorney General and the PSC staff suggest that any move to a model in which the
utilities seek to exit the obligation to serve would not be possible without a statutory
change to the New York Public Service Law.v Also under
consideration is whether New York should adopt a comprehensive program to assure
reasonably priced electricity for low-income customers. While several utilities have
agreed to small-scale programs to provide bill payment assistance to low-income customers,
there is no consensus on any statewide program design or funding mechanism for such
programs.
Rising prices, uncertain
supply in the New York City area, and uncertainty about the market-monitoring role by FERC
have stimulated more public attention to restructuring.vi
Some policymakers have begun to raise significant concerns and urge the PSC to either slow
down or make significant changes in this process.vii While
the Commission continues to take the leadership role, the New York Assemblyviii passed an overhaul of electric restructuring in mid-2002 that
was favorably received in the State Senate and opposed by the Republican leadership,
including the Governor.
The New York Commission has
refused to review ConEds retail rates and tariff provisions, even in the face of
persistent public outcry and consumer advocates attempts to force the PSC to review
retail prices charged in the summer of 2000, in light of the statutory requirement of
"just and reasonable" rates.ix However, the
Commission approved a "hedging" mechanism in the market price rate structure
that was implemented in August 2001.x Furthermore, the
ability of New York to survive the summer without significant power outages and the
existence of a FERC-approved price cap mechanismxi on
wholesale prices tempered the nature of the price spikes that occurred in 2001 and 2002.
Even so, the rates in effect for New York City residential customers remain very high.
On July 13, 2001, the
Administrative Law Judges assigned to the PSC's generic competition proceeding published a
Recommended Decision.xii Among the more significant
recommendations were proposals to do away with the
two-tiered system of consumer protections and apply the Home Energy Fair Practices Act
policies to all competitive energy providers and require that all energy providers be
directly regulated by the PSC. Also significant was the recommendation that the Commission
adopt an explicit "universal service goal" for the electric industry and endorse
low-income programs and rates. The judges recommended as well that the PSC focus first on
the development of workable wholesale competitive markets prior to any full-scale
implementation of retail competition. With respect to the Default Service issue, the
report rejected the notion of a POLR service that is more expensive than service from
non-POLR providers, stating that "Charging higher rates for essential energy services
to those who have few, if any additional choices and who may be least able to afford them
was not generally believed to be just and reasonable."xiii
While favoring competition
models that eventually remove the utility from the obligation to provide the energy
commodity, the judges recommended an approach that would not require a specific POLR,
particularly if all energy providers were governed by the same consumer protection
policies and rules and each had an obligation to serve. However, the judges did not make
clear how all customers would be moved to competitive providers, and even the authors
recognized that a POLR would have to exist for short-term services, such as when a
provider goes out of business. In the short run, the decision recommended the continuation
of utility-supplied default service until the wholesale market was viable and
could be relied upon to provide reasonable price signals and stimulate suppliers to make
offers to mass market customers. As of August 2002, the Commission has not ruled on these
recommendations, and it is not clear why there has been such a significant delay.
Upstate New York utilities,
such as New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (NYSEG) and Niagara Mohawk, have
proposed multi-year rate plans in which prices for generation service will be locked in
for a six- to eight-year period,
while providing customers with the option to seek lower prices in the competitive market.
This would substantially lengthen the transition period for these utilities. NYSEG has
been very vocal about the need to provide stable and fixed prices for residential
customers in particular and published an April 2001 paper on the New York States
electric energy crisis, describing the "broken train" that is the New York
wholesale market. The paper linked the coming period of uncertainty in wholesale prices
with the need to provide price certainty to consumers during this transition period.xiv
Supplier
Activity
Most of the suppliers currently active in the New York retail electricity market are
relatively "small" or "home grown" and not connected with energy
providers that are active in other states. Furthermore, the number of competitive
suppliers marketing to residential customers has dropped significantly in recent years. As
of May 2002, ConEds websitexv listed eight suppliers
who market electricity to residential and/or small commercial customers. However, two of
these are
local "cooperatives" limited to certain portions of the service territory, and
several others are reported to be inactive with respect to residential customers. Those
who do market to residential customers have attempted to contrast their fixed rate offers
(typically for at least one year, and several suppliers require two- to three-year
contracts) with the variable rates charged by ConEd.
Even with the relatively
small number of suppliers, however, the number of residential customers who have chosen
alternative suppliers has gradually increased in the ConEd service territory. As of May
2002,xvi 159,528 customers had "migrated" to
alternative suppliers, 137,601 of which were residential customers. This is the largest
number of
residential customers who have shopped in New York compared to any other electric utility.
Although this represents a 70 percent increase since December 2000, it is still only five
percent of ConEds residential customer accounts.
According to the web-based
Energy Guide,xvii there are five options available to
residential customers in the ConEd service territory, two from ConEdison Solutions, the
retail sales affiliate of Consolidated Edison, Inc. Of these five offers, one is for
"green" energy, three are fixed rates, and two are variable rate offers. As of
April 2002, every one of these offers project a higher bill than the current rates in
effect for ConEds default service rates. Furthermore, the fixed rate offers
require a minimum monthly charge in addition to the cents per kWh rate charged by the
supplier for actual usage, and this type of monthly charge results in higher per kWh
charges, particularly for low-usage customers. Clearly, marketers who signed up customers
for fixed rate deals during a period of high rates (last summer) are charging far more
than the ConEd prices for market supply service. Finally, it should be noted that at least
two of the marketers listed on ConEd chart have been the subject of investigation and
civil suits by the New York Attorney General for violations of consumer protection laws.
An unusual feature of the
New York retail marketxviii is that when customers leave
their local utility, they are not liable for certain state sales taxes on the distribution
or delivery portion of the bill, thus allowing competitive marketers to offer savings that
are based on tax loopholes rather than "real" energy savings. When this tax
loophole is combined with one-time or upfront customer rebates or sign-up bonuses,
customers are often led to believe that the suppliers offer is cheaper than the
current utility rates.
Of course, customers in the
ConEd service territory can only make decisions on annual savings based on the current
six-month projected rates that are provided every May and November by the utility, thus
complicating the comparison of the current rates with multi-year fixed rate offers from
marketers. As a result of these unique features, ConEds residential customers cannot
simply compare rates for the generation portion of the monthly electric bill. The
combination of the sales tax break on the distribution portion of the bill and the monthly
change in the ConEd generation supply portion of the bill makes shopping for energy a very
confusing concept for most customers. While some
suppliers quote monthly total bill savings, others focus on the energy portion of the
bill. The PSC has not mandated a uniform method of price disclosure to assist customers in
making "apples to apples" price comparisons among competitive suppliers.xix
Provider of Last
Resort
Unlike other restructuring plans approved in New York, Default Service under both ConEd
and Orange and Rockland (O&R, a subsidiary of ConEd) consists of a pass-through of
wholesale market prices to all customers. The method of passing through the wholesale
market prices is complicated and not transparent to customers. ConEd provides its
customers with estimated rates for the next six-month period every May and November.
However, the actual price charged for the generation supply portion of the bill varies
monthly according to a complicated formula designed to
reflect the wholesale market. As a result, the projected six-month rates are
"reconciled" and result in monthly bill changes for the energy portion of the
bill.
Contrary to the public
statements when the plan was adopted, this provision resulted in significant rate
increases for the generation portion of the bill beginning in the summer of 2000. As of
July 2000, ConEd residential customers were
paying 10 cents per kWh for generation alone, far higher than the 4-5 cents paid by
residential customers in upstate
New York and far higher than the 3.3 cents per kWh paid by ConEd residential customers in
1997. The average monthly bill for residential customers increased from approximately $52
in November 1999 to almost $75 in July 2000 and
leveled off at over $60 by late 2000.xx This resulted
in a total bill rate of over 19 cents per kWh, a 40 percent increase compared to
pre-competition prices.xxi The resulting furorxxii led to investigations that concluded that New York's wholesale
market was flawed, and ConEd publicly warned the Commission that a
"California-type" situation could
result without prompt action from both the New York PSC and FERC. Both the PSC and ConEd
initiated petitions to FERC to control prices on the wholesale market.xxiii
In the summer of 2001,
customers were charged 10.9 cents per kwh in May, 9.37 cents in June, 12.16 cents in July,
and 9.13 cents in August for the energy portion of the bill alone. Compared to comparable
months in 2000, the 2001 prices were significantly higher for May and August, but slightly
lower in June and July.xxiv Since August 2001, the
generation portion of the bill has averaged 5-6 cents per kWh, but rose in April to 7.16
cents.
Consumer Protection
Programs and Policies
Whether due to the lack of underlying legislative authority or the PSC's own policy
decision about the need for a "light" hand in the regulation of competitive
suppliers, the fact remains that the PSC has not adopted enforceable rules that are
directly applicable to competitive suppliers. Rather, the Commission has adopted
"Uniform Business Practices"xxv that require
utilities to adopt tariffs which require suppliers to adhere to certain practices as a
condition of entering the
utilitys retail access program. While the PSC could have required suppliers to
adhere to the uniform consumer protection rules applicable to regulated utility service,
and embodied in the Home Energy Fair Practices Act (HEFPA), it choose to adopt a lesser
standard.xxvi
HEFPA remains applicable to
utilities that provide POLR service. Furthermore, competitive suppliers cannot disconnect
service for nonpayment. As a result, some of the key consumer protections associated with
access to payment plans (to avoid disconnection), medical emergencies, and disconnection
itself remain applicable to all customers. However, competitive suppliers are exempt from
some key consumer protection provisions associated with HEFPA, particularly those
addressing deposits and prepayments, the obligation to offer payment arrangements, such as
budget payment plans, or those in response to notice of contract termination (and return
of customer to utilitys POLR service), response to medical emergencies, handling of
customer complaints, or limitations on late payment charges or contract
termination fees.
Unlike other state
commissions that have implemented retail electric competition, the New York PSC has not
adopted strong disclosure rules that require uniform price disclosures (although the PSC
has adopted a requirement for environmental disclosures). Furthermore, the
Commissions requirements governing a Terms of Service disclosure document to new
customers, bill format and disclosures, and regulation of certain contract terms,
particularly renewals and contract termination notices, lack the specificity and
enforceability imposed by commissions in other states. While the PSC does require that
marketers be "certified" by the Commission,xxvii this
procedure is not the legal equivalent of the licensing program in effect elsewhere. For
example, the Commission has not adopted any rules that govern suspension or revocation of
such certification and cannot levy civil penalties directly on marketers. Rather, the PSC
is typically left with the option of directing the utility to discontinue service to a
marketer.xxviii
A recent survey by AARP of
New York residents age 50 years or older documented strong support for consumer protection
programs and policies that should accompany the move to retail energy competition. More
than eight out of
10 New Yorkers surveyed believe that it is important for citizens to have the same
consumer protection rights with a private energy company as they had with their public
utility, and they support proposals to impose HEFPA requirements on competitive suppliers.xxix
A particular defect of the
New York restructuring program is the lack of any direct PSC enforcement mechanism over
competitive suppliers. Instead, the Commission appears to defer to the Attorney General
for enforcement activities. Furthermore, the PSC does not resolve customer complaints with
energy marketers, although it does monitor the number of complaints, and does not require
marketers to refer customers to the Commission for informal dispute resolution. Rather,
marketers are allowed to include mandatory arbitration or Small Claims Court provisions in
their pre-printed customer contracts.
The New York Attorney
General's Office has initiated enforcement actions against several marketers under the
states Unfair Trade Practices law. In April 2001, the A.G. settled a lawsuit against
Total Gas & Electric, Inc. (based in Florida), announcing customer restitution,
modification in marketing and sales practices, and the payment of a $200,000 civil
penalty.xxx This marketer, like many that have been subject
to state enforcement actions, specializes in door-to-door sales. More recently, the A.G.
announced that a suit had been filed against ECONnergy of Rockland, New York,
alleging numerous deceptive practices associated with door-to-door sales of energy
services in the ConEd and O&R service territories.xxxi Both
of these entities are still listed on the ConEd website as offering energy services to
residential customers, and the PSC has taken no formal action to investigate, suspend, or
halt the marketing activities
of either company, even though the A.G.s investigation against ECONnergy has been
underway for 18 months.
The most serious consumer
protection failure occurred in western New York State when numerous gas marketers suddenly
went out of business or declared bankruptcy after collecting deposits and prepayments from
residential and commercial customers. In the case of Iroquois Energy Management, the
company collected $1.8 million in prepaid natural gas service from customers, all of whom
were transferred back to the utility at higher prices, with little hope of seeing a dime
from the unsecured assets of the bankrupt marketer.xxxii In
response to this debacle, the PSC published a staff proposal on May 9, 2001xxxiii to regulate supplier deposits and prepayments more
strictly and to require marketers to submit evidence that funds collected from customers
for prepayments or deposits would be held for the benefit of such customers. The staff
also proposed that a residential customer deposit could not exceed twice the average
monthly bill.
A full year passed before
the Commissions Final Order on this proceeding, and in general the staffs
proposal was not adopted.xxxiv Instead of focusing
on direct PSC regulation of marketer security to prevent the loss of customer prepayments
or deposits, the Commission directed utilities to amend their retail access tariffs to
require marketers to submit evidence of creditworthiness prior to requiring prepayments or
deposits from customers. A marketer with a sufficiently high bond rating would not be
required to post any financial security. The staff proposal to regulate the amount of
security deposits was rejected, along with the proposals of most consumer organizations to
prohibit marketers from collecting prepaid service from residential customers.
The PSC has approved
metering competition for larger commercial and industrial customers, as well as billing
competition for all customers of competitive suppliers. Marketers can issue dual bills
(for generation supply service only), opt to bill on the utility bill, or issue a
consolidated bill that incorporates all the regulated utility charges as well as the
competitive energy charges. However, marketers in New York are not required to comply with
the mandatory consumer protection and billing rules applicable to utilities (i.e., HEFPA).
Nor are marketers subject to similar bill format and disclosure rules. In fact, several
marketers in New York only offer on-line billing, with automated payment by credit card or
debit to the customers checking account within 10 days of the issuance of the bill
(and an e-mail to the customer), dispensing entirely with paper bills or the opportunity
to pay by check.xxxv
Consumer Education
The consumer education effort in New York generally has been conducted by the PSC itself
(with a modest $1 million budget for the entire statexxxvi
and by the individual utilities. The utilities have spent $5-6 million/year on this
effort. The total expenditures by both the PSC and the utilities are equal to
$1/year/customer. The Public Service Commissions theme, "Your Energy, Your
Choice" is not mimicked by the utilities, but their themed approach is typically
similar (e.g., NIMOs "You Choose, We Deliver"). In addition, the New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) has conducted an extensive
education campaign focused on energy efficiency and demand response activities that are
funded by the PSC-sanctioned Social Benefits Charge.xxxvii
However, unlike
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maine, and other states, New York has not adopted a unified education
plan for retail electric competition and does not require the utilities to contribute to a
Commission-led and controlled education campaign. Nor are the utilities required to use
the same terminology when referring to retail access, the sale of generation service, or
the regulated portions of the utility business. Awareness levels among customers remain
relatively low compared to states that have conducted more aggressive multi-media
campaigns.
Universal Service
Programsxxxviii
Utilities spend about $23 million annually on low-income programs in New York State, most
of which is reflected in utility rates. These programs are utility-specific, and the bulk
of the funding goes to energy efficiency programs (refrigerator replacement, lighting,
weatherization, etc.). Several utilities operate bill payment assistance programs, mostly
as arrears forgiveness or reductions in the monthly customer charge for low-income
customers, such as Keyspan Energys Residential Reduced Rate for natural gas
customers or NYSEGs Power Partners Program, which coordinates the delivery of energy
efficiency services with bill reductions. However, these programs are relatively small and
enroll only a small percentage of the eligible low-income customers. Furthermore, the bulk
of the dollars are directed to natural gas customers and not baseload electricity
customers.
In addition to the
utility-funded and controlled programs, the PSC ordered the implementation of the System
Benefits Charge in 1996. In early 1998, NYSERDA was designated the administrator of the
public benefits programs. These programs, collectively named the New York Energy Smart
Program, include energy efficiency, low-income services (those not directly implemented by
the utilities in the $23 million figure provided above), research and development, and
environmental protection monitoring and analysis associated with the transition to
competitive markets. Funding for the SBC was set by the PSC at $150 million annually in
early 2001. Of this amount, 14.1 percent is allocated to
low-income programs, a portion of which is used to educate low-income customers and
communities on the opportunities to reduce bills through participation in the direct
access or retail competition programs.
Due to the high
concentration of multi-unit dwellings in New York, low-income consumer advocates often
focus on bill reduction strategies that should be funded by utilities for these types of
structures. According to one recent study, alternative suppliers have done little to
market electricity or provide efficiency services to low-use and low-income customers.
Furthermore, the New York practice of closely integrating its public assistance programs
with direct payments to the clients energy vendor has not been replicated or
unraveled among energy marketers to allow such customers to shop for electricity or
natural gas and be assured that their assistance payments will follow them to new
suppliers.xxxix
ConEd does not offer bill
payment assistance to low-income customers generally, but it has frozen the monthly
customer charge at pre-1996 levels for customers who receive automatic vendor payments
within Public Assistance. No reconnection fee is charged for LIHEAP recipients
disconnected for nonpayment. In addition, there is a modest refrigerator replacement
program available to elderly and disabled customers who receive SSI or HEAP. However,
ConEds website does not describe this program or refer potentially eligible
customers to any agency for possible low-income bill payment assistance.
Preliminary Conclusions and Observations
The pending PSC decision on its Market Structure proceeding will be crucial to the
determination of the regulatory
"rules of the game" in New York and in future iterations of the ConEd retail
access program. As frequently pointed out
by proponents of the retail access approach in New York, the lack of legislation does
allow the PSC to make changes and react to unforeseen developments. However, the lack of
certainty in the overall approach and industry structure -- as reflected in part by the
fact that the Recommended Decision in the Market Structure and the POLR proceeding have
been pending for over a year -- has certainly contributed to the lack of robust activity
by competitive suppliers. While such lack of interest can be explained by the price
stability and rate freezes in effect at most utilities, the price volatility experienced
by ConEd customers has certainly not produced significant public or market interest in
competition in that area.
The retail uncertainty in New York is only exacerbated by the uncertainty of the
wholesale market and the pending proposal by FERC to combine the New York Independent
System Operation with New England and/or the mid-Atlantic state market (PJM). Finally, the
two-tiered system of consumer protections and the marketer failures and consumer losses
associated with numerous natural gas marketers in western New York (as well as the
violations of consumer protection laws documented by the Attorney General) has contributed
to customer dissatisfaction.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
i There are only
three power plants within Con Eds service territory and they were sold to three
different entities. With the transfer of ownership, the ability to regulate the prices
charged by the owners of these facilities passed from the New York PSC to FERC.
ii New York Public
Service Commission, Case 96-E-0897, In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York,
Inc.'s plans for Electric Rate/Restructuring pursuant to Opinion No. 96-12, February 28,
2000. See also Opinion 97-16 at 2, ("New York City and Westchester consumers will
receive lower average electric bills."), 15 ("For all other customers, there
will be a 10% rate reduction phased in over the term of the Settlement."), 26
("The 10% cumulative base rate reduction for commercial and residential customers is
firm, and no longer dependent on future contingencies.")
iii New York PSC,
Case 00-M-0504, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission regarding Provider of Last Resort
Responsibilities, the Role of Utilities in Competitive Energy Markets, and Fostering the
Development of Retail Competitive Opportunities.
iv Energy
Competition Next Steps, Draft Phase I and II Consensus Report, Case 00-M-0504, January
2001.
v Press Release, New
York State Electric and Gas Co., ANYSEG Proposes Electric Price Protection Plan that
Freezes Rates and Assures Energy Reliability, March 8, 2001, http://www.nyseg.com.
vi Banerjee, Neela and Perez-Pena, Richard, "Power
Politics: A Failed Energy Plan Catches Up to New York," New York Times, June
1, 2001.
vii See, e.g., H. Carl McCall, New York State Comptroller,
"Electric Deregulation in New York State: The Need for a Comprehensive Plan, Feb.,
2001.
viii New York State Transitional Energy Plan, 11 separate
pieces of legislation. These bills are summarized and links to the bills themselves are
provided at http://www.pulp.tc.
ix AARP and the Public Utility Law Project (PULP) and
others petitioned the PSC to initiate a proceeding to investigate rates charged by Con
Edison in 2000, but the Commission denied that petition on May 2, 2001. New York PSC,
Order Denying Petition, Case 00-E-1750.
x New York PSC, Order Concerning Sharing Mechanism and
Directing Filing of Tariff Amendment, Case 96-E-0897, July 18, 2001.
xi FERC finally approved a "circuit breaker" or
automated mitigation procedure for NYISO in late June 2001. When bids on the day ahead
market exceed $150 per MW hour, an automatic review occurs to prevent a generator from
withholding capacity to drive up prices. This mechanism is separate from the wholesale
price of power, which is capped at $1,000 per MWh throughout the Northeast.
xii Recommended Decision, Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission Regarding Provider of Last Resort Responsibilities, the Role of Utilities in
Competitive Energy Markets, and Fostering Development of Retail Competitive Opportunities,
Case 00-M-0504, July 13, 2001.
xiii Recommended Decision, fn.87, at 46.
xiv NYSEG, "New York States Electric Energy
Crisis and New York State Electric & Gas Corporations Comprehensive
Solution", April 2001, available at http://www.nyseg.com.
xv www.coned.com/athome/custnews/residentialesco.html
xvi www.dps.state.ny.us/Electric_RA_Migration.htm
xvii http://www.energyguide.com/
xviii This sales tax exemption is not widely known and
not publicized as part of the consumer education program. As a result, suppliers advertise
savings and rebates that reflect this tax loophole without identifying the source of the
projected bill reduction.
xix While several PSC staff members indicated that they
thought that comparative shopping information could be provided independently by web-based
or other entities. However, the Commission has not done any research to determine the
scope or depth of customer awareness or use of the existing comparative information, such
as that maintained by Energy Guide.com.
xx
Office of the State Comptroller, New York, "Electric Deregulation in New York State:
The Need for a Comprehensive Plan," February, 2001, Chart C.
xxi PSC data as summarized by the Public
Utility Law Project in their comments on the PSC Price Spike Mitigation Proposals, see fn.
42.
xxii Wall Street Journal, "Mismanagement of
NY Power Mkt Costs Millions to Utilities," October 5, 2000.
xxiii See, Department of Public Service Pricing Team, Interim
Pricing Report on New York State's Independent System Operation, December 2000;
"Con Edison Asks FERC to Close Loopholes That Enable New York Generators to Exercise
Market Power; Additional Price Protection for Customers and a More Competitive Marketplace
Sought," Con Edison Press Release, March 2, 2001; APSC Chair Announces Five Point
Plan for Regional Energy Markets and Managing Demand for Electricity, PSC Press Release,
February 20, 2001.
xxiv Consolidated Edison provides price comparisons
between its own prices and suppliers offering service in its territory at http://www.energyguide.com/finder/welcome.asp By the fall of 2001, prices offered by alternative
suppliers (many of whom were offering fixed rates) were uniformly higher than the default
service provided by ConEd, due to the drop in wholesale market prices compared to
ConEds estimates.
xxv The most recent version of the Uniform Retail Access
Business Practices was adopted in November 2001. See http://www.dps.state.ny.us/ubr.htm for the
history of this initiative.
xxvi Case 94-E-0952, Opinion and Order Establishing
Regulatory Policies for the Provision of Retail Energy Services, Opinion No. 97-5, issued
May 19, 1997.
xxvii The certification application is extremely sparse
and is accompanied by directions that indicate that the marketer must submit its Terms of
Service and copy of its bill format as part of the application. However, there are no
specific directives with respect to these disclosures, other than various
"recommendations" for content. See www.dps.state.ny.us/escoapp.htm.
xxviii In the case of Iroquois Energy Management, Inc.,
the Commission issued an Order Allowing Discontinuance of Service that described how the
underlying distribution utility (National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.) had issued a notice
of discontinuance to Iroquois pursuant to the Commissions Uniform Business
Practices. The Commission affirmed the utilitys decision and approved the less than
10-day notice on the grounds of emergency. Case 98-M-1343, October 26, 2000.
xxix AARP New York Energy Survey, March 2002, http://research.aarp.org/consume/ny_energy_1.html.
xxx http://archive.pulp.tc/electric_perfect_storm.pdf
xxxi http://archive.pulp.tc/electric_perfect_storm.pdf
xxxii http://archive.pulp.tc/electric_perfect_storm.pdf
xxxiii Case 00-M-0504,
Notice Soliciting Comments, May 9, 2001.
xxxiv Case 00-M-0504,
Order Concerning ESCO Deposits and Prepayments, May 9, 2002.
xxxv See, e.g.,
Smart Energy at www.smartenergy.com.
xxxvi The
Commissions program has used newspapers, TV, and radio announcements, as well as an
intensive person-to-person effort with Staff appearances at county fairs, community
events, etc.
xxxvii See http://www.nyserda.org/newsbcprograms.html
xxxviii Most of this
information was obtained by the NYSERDA Draft Energy Plan for New York, December 2001,
available at http://www.nyserda.org/sep.html.
xxxix Hepinstall,
David and Saffer, Rhona, Case Study of the Move to Retail Competition in the Electric
Industry in NY State, Association for Energy Affordability, December 2000.
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